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Using new data from the first two waves of the Understanding Society COVID-19 Study collected in April
and in May 2020 in the UK, we study the labour market shocks that individuals experienced in the first
wave of the pandemic, and the steps they and their households took to cope with those shocks.
Understanding Society is based on probability samples and the Covid-19 Study is constructed carefully
to support valid population inferences. The Covid-19 Study collected novel data on the mitigation strate-
gies that individuals and households employ. Further, prior observation of respondents in the panel
allows us to characterize regressivity with respect to pre-pandemic economic positions. Our key findings
are that those with precarious employment, aged under 30 and from minority ethnic groups faced the
biggest labour market shocks. Almost 50% of individuals have experienced declines in household earnings
of at least 10%, but declines are most severe in the bottom pre-pandemic income quintiles. Methods of
mitigation vary substantially across groups: borrowing and transfers from family and friends are most
prevalent among those most in need.
 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction government schemes to mitigate the impact may benefit someThe onset of COVID-19 has caused a substantial contraction in
economic activity, partly through individuals changing their beha-
viour in the face of the health risks and partly because of restric-
tions introduced by governments. In this paper we show that the
scale of the economic impact of the COVID shock in the UK is very
different for different people. These differences arise partly
because the direct impact differs depending on individual charac-
teristics and what sort of work people do, and partly because indi-
viduals take different steps to mitigate the shock. Further,but not others. The paper highlights the idiosyncratic nature of
the economic shocks and shows how heterogeneity across house-
holds and differences in methods of mitigating shocks mean the
same economic shock has very different implications.
Our work makes three contributions to understanding the eco-
nomic effects of COVID-19 and the role of the UK government in
mitigating those effects. First, our results are based on a large, high
quality longitudinal survey derived from probability samples. We
use the first two waves of the Understanding Society COVID-19
Study alongside information from the long-running Understanding
Society Main Study. We show the importance of using carefully
modelled inverse probability weights and data derived from proper
probability samples to capture accurately the differential effects of
the aggregate shock; we also provide statistical tests of the efficacy
of the weighting strategy. Second, the long panel of pre-COVID-19
data provides a clear picture of pre-pandemic economic positions,
and this provides crucial context with which to assess the regres-
sivity of the economic consequences of the pandemic. Third, to
address who is best able to mitigate the crisis and how the govern-
ment has mitigated the crisis, the COVID-19 web surveys provide
novel information on what mechanisms have mitigated losses for
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unique perspective on how COVID-19 has changed the economic
reality faced by different individuals in the UK.
The backdrop to these changes in labour market status is how
the UK government supported workers and households. The UK
went into ‘‘lockdown” on 23rd March and the economy contracted
substantially in March and April. The economy then began to grow
again but by the end of May, GDP was still 24% below its level in
February.1 In terms of economic support policies, the UK govern-
ment introduced the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme on March
20th, soon followed by the Self-Employment Support Scheme. The
UK government pursued a policy of explicitly protecting jobs
through the Job Retention Scheme whereby workers were ‘‘fur-
loughed” by their firms. This meant 80% of pay would be covered
by a government subsidy, subject to a maximum of £2500, and
was conditional on the worker not providing any hours of work. As
a result, rates of unemployment remained low at around 4% through
the first wave of the pandemic. This strategy is in contrast to the US
where support operated through additional payments to the unem-
ployed, and the unemployment rate rose quickly to 14.7%.
We split our analysis into showing differences in the economic
shock to labour markets and then into showing differences in
actions take to mitigate the economic shock. We find substantial
impacts on labour markets, but these impacts do not show up in
employment levels which changed very little between February
and the end of May. On the other hand, the fraction who are work-
ing a positive number of hours declined by 25 percentage points by
the end of April, followed by a slight bounce back. The difference
between the fraction employed and the fraction working positive
hours highlights the effect of the Job Retention Scheme at keeping
workers in the same jobs.
There is however substantial heterogeneity in the economic
impact and mitigation strategies across groups. The young and
those without any guaranteed hours of work experienced substan-
tial falls in hours worked at the onset of COVID, and corresponding
large falls in household earnings. But by the end of May, the decline
in hours worked for these groups had been partly reversed, and fur-
ther, household earnings showed less cumulative declines at this
stage than for other groups. Mitigation of earnings losses by the
young and precariously employed was partly through savings, but
key components were finding newwork andmoving onto universal
credit. Again, these mitigation strategies were very different from
other groups.
Black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) groups experienced
different labour market shocks from non-BAME groups.2 The
decline in the fraction working positive hours was similar between
BAME and non-BAME groups, but the reason that hours fell differed
markedly. Whereas the decline for non-BAME groups was primarily
driven by being moved onto the Job Retention Scheme rather than
into unemployment, the decline among BAME groups was driven
in equal measure by being moved into unemployment. Comparing
the groups, among those whose hours fell, 15 percentage points
fewer from BAME groups were put on the Job Retention Scheme,
and 13 percentage points more made unemployed. Further, the earn-
ings losses that resulted were mitigated in different ways: the inci-
dence of borrowing was higher among BAME groups, as was the
incidence of transfers from family and friends.
Finally, we use the data from themainUnderstanding Society study
to show how regressive the crisis has proved to be: those in the low-
est pre-pandemic average income quintiles have had the worst expe-
riences. They have experienced the largest declines in the fraction
working positive hours, and the largest declines in household earn-1 https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/bulletins/gdp-
monthlyestimateuk/august2020.
2 Sample size limitations mean we cannot disaggregate further.
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ings. For those in these lowest quintiles, these losses were mitigated
by borrowing and by transfers from family and friends.
This pattern of regressive impacts of COVID-19 arrives after
three decades of worsening inequality in gross earnings in the UK
(Blundell et al., 2018). This long run trend towards greater inequal-
ity has been primarily due to declines in working hours lower down
the distribution. The regressive impact of COVID-19 on work pat-
terns exacerbates this: the percentage declines in working hours
are greater for the bottom two quintiles. The long-run increase in
inequality has been offset by expansions in the government safety
net in the UK over the past 30 years that mean net household
income inequality actually fell. However, cuts in benefit generosity
in the years immediately prior to COVID-19 meant that there was
already less protection for low income households (Bourquin
et al., 2020). Further, the evidence we show through the first wave
of COVID is that much of the mitigation of the decline in earnings
has come through using private saving or transfers.
Our results contribute to a fast-moving literature looking at the
labour market consequences of COVID-19 and the impact of gov-
ernment support schemes. Much of the evidence comes from rapid
surveys with quota samples, or convenience samples ex post cali-
brated to population totals on the basis of a limited number of
observable characteristics like age and gender. For example,
Adams-Prassl et al. (2020) report large effects in the U.K. on the
young, on women and on those in insecure work, and (Belot
et al., 2020) report a similar age effect. These studies have given
initial indications of the effects of COVID-19 for the sample sur-
veyed, but can only provide population estimates under very
strong assumptions about sample inclusion and response.
For the US, the March 2020 US Current Population Survey is
derived from reliable probability samples and it shows increased
unemployment, decreased working hours, but little fall in wages
(Béland et al., 2020). Cortes and Matias (2020) shows that the
labour market impacts were bigger for men, younger workers, His-
panics, and the less educated, although (Montenovo et al., 2020)
finds larger effects for women and those with larger families.
Couch et al. (2020) find employment rates for Latinx were dispro-
portionately hit, whereas African-Americans were not. On the
other hand, the lack of a furlough scheme in the US means that,
unlike the UK, there is no distinction to draw between being fur-
loughed and being unemployed. Larger shocks for vulnerable pop-
ulations have also been documented in data from probability
samples for the Netherlands (von Gaudecker et al., 2020) and Ger-
many (Schröder et al., 2020); and from population registers for
Norway (Alstadsæter et al., 2020). The present paper is the first
to report credible population estimates for the UK.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 gives addition detail
about our data and Section 3 discusses drawing population infer-
ences from survey data. Section 4 documents changes in employ-
ment and hours from a pre-pandemic baseline in February 2020
through April and May of 2020. Section 5 reports the impact of
these shocks on household earnings, and Section 6 documents
the heterogeneity in the steps taken to mitigate the impact of
households earnings losses. Section 7 concludes.2. Data
This paper is based on the first two waves of the Understanding
Society COVID-19 study (henceforth COVID-19 Study), fielded in,
respectively, late April and late May of 2020; these surveys also
collected retrospective information about February 2020.3 The3 Further information on the Understanding Society COVID-19 Study can be found in
Institute for Social and Economic Research (2020b) and Institute for Social and
Economic Research (2020a).
T.F. Crossley, P. Fisher and H. Low Journal of Public Economics 193 (2021) 104334COVID-19 study is built upon Understanding Society: the UK House-
hold Longitudinal Study (henceforth the Main Study) and uses
monthly web surveys to capture the experiences and behaviour of
Main Study participants during the COVID-19 pandemic. This means,
first, that the COVID-19 Study inherits the properties of the Main
Study that ensure reliable population inferences, and second, that
data collected by the COVID-19 Study can be linked to data collected
on the same participants, and their households, by past waves of the
Main Study.4
With minor exceptions, all members of the Main Study who
were aged sixteen or over in April 2020, and who belonged to
active households, were invited to participate in the COVID-19
Study.5 Pre-notification letters introducing the study were sent to
42,330 Main Study members on 17 April. Of these, 32,596 had com-
pleted the Wave 9 annual interview in 2017/18 (the latest released
wave of the Main Study). Respondents were offered a small financial
incentive for each web survey. Subsequently, invitations to each web
survey were sent by email and/or SMS text message, or by post. Each
web survey had a 7-day fieldwork period and reminders were sent
on days 2, 3, and 6.6 Each web questionnaire took approximately
20 min to complete.
Among those who had given a full adult interview in theWave 9
annual interview, the response rates to April and May web surveys
were 48.6% and 49.1 % respectively.7 These response rates are sim-
ilar to the response rates of large government surveys in the UK.8
These are also very good response rates for a voluntary web survey
that attempts to contact a known set of individuals (so that non-
respondents are identified: convenience and quota samples do not
have knowable response rates). Nevertheless, this is significantly
below the 85–90 % overall wave-on-wave retention rate that the
Main Study achieves by following up web non-respondents by direct
interviewer contact.
There were 17,452 respondents to the April web survey and
14,811 in May. Most of our analysis focuses on individuals that
reached the end of both surveys.9 The COVID-19 study weighting
strategy, which we describe in more detail in the next section, and
which is the basis for our population inferences, assigns a positive
sample weight to respondents who also responded to Wave 9 of
the Main Study and had a positive Wave 9 sample weight. This gives
a basic analysis sample of 10,892 individual respondents. We further
restrict our attention on respondents aged 20 to 65 in order to focus
on the working age population and exclude a small number of
respondents who provide incomplete information in February 2020
on hours of work or employment. This gives a final analysis sample
of 7,404 individuals.
The fact that the Covid-19 study is based on a pre-existing panel
study means that we can document not only how shocks vary
across individuals but how those shocks vary by pre-pandemic4 Understanding Society (University of Essex Institute for Social and Economic
Research, NatCen Social Research, and Kantar Public, n.d.) is the UK’s main
longitudinal Household Survey, and one of the largest household panel studies in
the world. It began in 2009 but carries on from the earlier British Household Panel
survey which ran from 1991 to 2008.Understanding Society attempts to interview all
adults in sample households annually and has a mixed mode design, with some panel
members responding via a face-to-face interview and some completing a web
interview.
5 An active household is one that participated in at least one of the last two waves
of the main study.
6 The first web survey was fielded on April 24th and the second on May 27th.
7 5,519 fewer main sample members were invited to the May survey, as some April
non-respondents were issued to a telephone follow up survey instead, and a further
group either entirely opted out of the COVID-19 study at the April invitation or were
determined to be no longer eligible.
8 For example, the Labour Force Survey – to which many web surveys with quota or
convenience samples calibrate – has response rate of about 55% at the first wave,
falling with subsequent and about 40 % overall. The Family Resources Survey which is
the basis for official income statistics had a response rate of 52% in 2017/18.
9 That is, individuals who were ‘‘full respondents” in both April and May.
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economic position. For our distributional analysis we created a
measure of ‘‘average pre-COVID-19” income. This measure aver-
ages household net income across up to three previous waves of
the main study, and assigns individual respondents to quintiles
of income on that basis.10 For this purpose income includes earned
and unearned income, net of tax and inclusive of any benefits
received, equivalised by household composition. It is important to
note that the COVID-19 study is individual-based, and supports
inferences about the distribution of income (for example) across
adults rather than across households. Household income and other
household variables are viewed as attributes of individuals.3. Population inferences
Distributional analysis is inherently about estimating finite
population quantities and gradients. The ability of the Main Study,
and by extension the COVID-19 Study, to deliver credible popula-
tion estimates rests on the fact that the Main Study is based on
probability samples, and on the use of carefully designed
inverse-probability (IP) weights.11
A defining feature of probability samples is that every unit in
the target population has a knowable, nonzero probability of selec-
tion (Valliant and Dever, 2018). This offers two important advan-
tages over other types of samples (such as convenience or quota
samples). First, the fact that all units in the target population have
a nonzero probability of selection ensures that, with sufficiently
large sample sizes, the full range of heterogeneity in the target
population will be captured. Second, known selection probabilities
mean that consistent estimates of population parameters and asso-
ciated inferences can be obtained with well-established statistical
methods involving IP weighting (see Wooldridge (2002) and the
references therein).
Of course, real samples deviate from the theoretical ideal of a
probability sample because of non-response, including, in the case
of longitudinal studies, attrition. Nevertheless, there are multiple
advantages to beginning from probability samples. First, while sta-
tistical adjustments may be needed to account for nonrandom
attrition and non-response, such adjustments will be smaller if
the initial selection probabilities are known. Second, when a study
begins with a probability sample, useful information is often avail-
able on non-respondents. This is particularly true in longitudinal
studies where rich information on individuals who attrit is avail-
able from past waves of the survey. When information is available
on both respondents and non-respondents, the models of response
probability that underlay IP weights can be estimated directly. In
contrast, with convenience or quota samples information is only
available for respondents, and the relationship between response
probabilities and observable characteristics can only be inferred
indirectly by comparing sample characteristics to external totals.12
This approach leads to what we refer to as ‘‘calibration weights”
because the procedure calibrates a sample with entirely unknown
inclusion probabilities to external totals. This procedure is less effi-
cient, but more importantly, the set of variables used in the adjust-
ment is typically very limited (for example, just age, education and
gender). As discussed in Moffit et al. (1999), Wooldridge (2002),
weights correct for selection on observables, and so the richness of
observable predictors of response is critical. Finally, other types of
samples may have a zero probability that certain parts of the target10 95 percent of the sample uses the full 3 observation average, 4 percent uses 2
observations and the remaining cases use one observation only.
11 The Understanding Society Main Study is a combination of four different
probability samples. See University of Essex Institute for Social and Economic
Research, NatCen Social Research, and Kantar Public (n.d.) for more details.
12 Ideally those totals would come from a census or register, but in practice they
often come from a probability-sample based survey.
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come the complete absence of a subgroup from the sample.
The Main Study employs state of the art methods to minimize
non-response and attrition. It also provides carefully-modelled IP
weights to account for the nonrandom nature of the remaining
attrition.13 The extent to which the Main Study is ‘‘representative”,
in the sense of supporting high quality inferences about population
quantities, is continually evaluated: see Benzeval et al. (2020a) and
the references therein.14 The study has been judged repeatedly to
be of high quality: as just one example, Main Study income data
aligns well with national statistics on the income distribution in
the UK (Fisher et al., 2019). Given this robust evidence that (suitably
weighted) waves of the Main Study provide reliable estimates of
population quantities and gradients, the remaining issue is non-
response to COVID-19 Study among respondents to Wave 9 of the
Main Study.
IP weights are released with each wave of the COVID-19
Study.15 These weights were created via an adjustment to the
cross-sectional weights available for Wave 9 of the Main Study. This
means that the probability of response to each wave in the COVID-19
Study is modeled as the product of the conditional probability of
response to that survey (given Main Study Wave 9 response) and
the probability of Wave 9 response. The conditional probability of
a response to a COVID-19 wave is modeled as a function of informa-
tion known at the time of issue to the COVID-19 Study. The resulting
weights map the set of respondents to a given COVID-19 wave back
to the target population at the time of Wave 9 (2017/18).16
The choice set of predictors for response include basic demo-
graphics, household composition, economic variables and health
variables, all drawn from the rich information collected by past
waves of the Main Study. Note again that because the target sam-
ple is drawn from the Main Study, this information is available for
both respondents and non-respondents to the COVID-19 Study. In
addition, both the econometrics and survey statistics literatures
(Moffit et al., 1999; Nicoletti and Peracchi, 2005) emphasize the
importance of including in weighting models variables that predict
response and are potentially correlated with outcomes being stud-
ied, but are unlikely to be including in standard economic or social
science models. Examples include previous survey outcomes, sur-
vey design variables and survey paradata. Several such variables
turn out to be good predictors of the conditional probability of
response in the COVID-19 Study. These include indicator variables
for the types of contact information the survey team held about the
respondent prior to the COVID-19 Study (email address, mobile
phone number, both, neither) and the realized mode of previous
waves of the main survey. The former may affect the salience of
the survey request while the latter may be related to how easily
the respondent would find it to complete a web survey. Either
could quite plausibly be related to whether the respondent is
employed or to the kind work they do. Variable selection for the
final models from the initial set is done by LASSO.
In addition to the cross-sectional weights for the April and May
waves, we also employ a weight for the balanced panel of individ-
uals who responded to both the April and May waves. This weight
was derived using the same methods.
It is common place to assess survey weights or weighted data
by comparing summary statistics to some benchmark. We go fur-
ther and offer a formal statistical test for whether the weights cap-
ture the probability of retention to wave t of a longitudinal data set,13 The development of the Main Study weights is described in Lynn and Olena
(2010).
14 ‘‘Representative” is a widely-used but ill-defined term. See the discussion in
Benzeval et al. (2020a).
15 The weights were developed by the authors of this paper.
16 Updated for subsequent mortality and emigration, but not immigration.
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given response at wave t  1, and then apply this test to the
COVID-19 Study (given response to Wave 9 of the Main study.)
While the literature contains a number of tests for whether panel
attrition is random (see for example, Fitzgerald et al., 1998), the
test we propose tests instead whether the weights deal adequately
with nonrandom attrition.17
Let Yt1;i be an observation of any variable of interest, Y for indi-
vidual i in wave t  1; Rt;i ¼ 1 if i responds to wave t (of the COVID-
19 Study) and 0 otherwise; and similarly Rt1;i ¼ 1 if the individual
responds to wave t  1 (here Wave 9 of the Main Study). Xt1;i is a
set of predictors of response observed for both respondents and
nonrespondents, prior to the realization of Rt;i (up to and including
time t  1). Xt2;i is defined analogously. Note that these may con-
tain lagged values of Y. Let wt1;iðXt2;iÞ < 1 be the wave t  1
weight. This is the inverse of the wave t  1 response probability.
Analogously, wt;iðXt1;iÞ < 1 is the wave t weight. In this case, this
is one of the COVID-19 Study IP weights. st1;i ¼ wt1;iPwt1;i is the wave
t  1 weight share and sti is is the wave t weight share, defined in
the same way.
Under the joint null that
E½Rt1;ijYt1;i;Xt2;i ¼ E½Rt1;ijXt2;i ¼ 1=wt1;iðXt2;iÞ
and
E½Rt;ijXt1;i;Yt1;i ¼ E½Rt;ijXt1;i ¼ 1=wt;iðXt1;iÞ;
i.e. the response to the relevant waves is independent of Yt1 given
pre-response observables:18
E½st1;iRt1;iYt1;i  st;iRt;iYt1;i ¼ 0 ð1Þ
This moment condition captures the fact that under the joint null,
either combination of respondents and associated weights provide
a consistent estimate of E½Yt1;i, and this provides a simple statisti-
cal test of the adequacy of the weights. All of the sets of weights
developed for the Covid-19 Study are subjected to these tests, for
a wide range variables of interest (Yt1;i). As an illustration, Table 1
reports the results of test of this type using theWave 1 (April) cross-
section weight. The first column shows the estimated population
mean of Yt1;i using the Wave 9 (main study) response sample
and associated Wave 9 weights. The next three columns show esti-
mates of the same mean using only respondents to the April COVID-
19 Study, either unweighted (Column 2), with a crude calibration
weight (Column 3), or with the full IP weights (Column 4). The cal-
ibration weight matches the April COVID-19 Study data to theWave
9 Main Study data on the basis of set of cells defined by gender, age
and education. It mimics the kind of calibration weights often
employed with convenience samples, or the composition of a quota
sample.19 Previous research (Couper et al., 2007; Schonlau et al.,
2009) has concluded that weighting on demographics alone is unli-
kely to deal adequately with selection into web surveys. Neverthe-
less, patterns of internet use have changed significantly over the
past fifteen years, so we take the opportunity to revisit the issue
here.
The last two columns report test statistics based on Eq. (1) and
associated p-values, for the calibration weights (column 5) and full
IP weights (Column 6). The test is reported for an illustrative set of
variables, Yt1;i, with each row of the table corresponding to a dif-
ferent Yt1;i. These Yt1;i variables are presented in two groups. The
first group are variables that are included in the estimated model
of response to Wave 1 of the COVID-19 Study. These include mea-
sures of subjective financial satisfaction, housing tenure, occupa-17 Similar tests are reported in Schonlau et al. (2009).
18 We also require the technical condition E½Yt1;i wt1;i < 1 and E½Yt1;i wt;i < 1;
Wooldridge (2002).
19 See for example Adams-Prassl et al. (2020) and Belot et al. (2020).
Table 1
Statistical testing of survey weights.
Wave 9 Covid Test
Weighted Unweighted Calibration Full IP Calibration Full IP
weight weight
In Full IP weight only:
Subjective finances:
Living comfortably/ 0.71 0.76 0.76 0.71 0.04⁄⁄⁄ 0.00
doing alright (0.000) (0.632)
Just about getting by 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.03⁄⁄⁄ 0.00
(0.000) (0.616)
Finding it quite/ 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.01⁄⁄⁄ 0.01
very difficult (0.000) (0.109)
Housing tenure:
Owned 0.34 0.40 0.41 0.33 0.06⁄⁄⁄ 0.01
(0.000) (0.076)
Mortgage 0.34 0.42 0.40 0.36 0.07⁄⁄⁄ 0.02⁄⁄⁄
(0.000) (0.000)
Rented 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.03⁄⁄⁄ 0.00
(0.000) (0.487)
Social Housing 0.19 0.09 0.10 0.19 0.09⁄⁄⁄ 0.00
(0.000) (0.587)
Low skill occupation 0.38 0.29 0.33 0.38 0.05⁄⁄⁄ 0.00
(0.000) (0.802)
Any savings income 0.36 0.45 0.44 0.37 0.08⁄⁄⁄ 0.01
(0.000) (0.086)
Behind with some or 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.02⁄⁄⁄ 0.00
all bills (0.000) (0.685)
In neither weighting model:
Poverty 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.03⁄⁄⁄ 0.01
(0.000) (0.320)
Receives core benefit 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.02⁄⁄⁄ 0.00
(0.000) (0.755)
Behind with housing 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.03⁄⁄⁄ 0.00
(0.000) (0.730)
Smoker 0.15 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.05⁄⁄⁄ 0.02⁄⁄
(0.000) (0.002)
Long-standing illness 0.38 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.04⁄⁄⁄ 0.02⁄
(0.000) (0.029)
Notes: P-values are reported in parenthesis. ⁄ p < 0.05, ⁄⁄ p < 0.01, ⁄⁄⁄ p < 0.001. IP weights are Inverse Probability weights. ‘Core benefits’ include Income Support, Job Seeker’s
Allowance and Universal Credit.
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that the null is rejected for calibration weights for all of these vari-
ables, but when the full IP weights are employed, the null is
rejected only for the percentage owning a home with a mortgage.
The magnitude of the moment is the difference between the
weighted sample mean of the variable Yt1;i and its target value
in theWave 9 Main Study. A comparison of the two columns shows
that the reduction in the size of this difference is economically sig-
nificant when moving from the calibration weights to the full IP
weights. For example, using the calibration weights, we would
overestimate the fraction of individuals reporting that they were
living comfortably by 4 percentage points, and overestimate the
fraction managing to save some of their income by 8 percentage
points, and underestimate the fraction of individuals living in
social housing by 9 percentage points.
The second set of Yt1;i variables we consider are those that are
not included in the the estimated model of response. These are
indicators for being in poverty, in receipt of core benefits, in arrears
on rent or mortgage payments, being a current smoker, or having a
long-standing illness. These Wave 9 target variables that are not in
the response model potentially give a better indication of the abil-
ity of the Covid-19 IP weights to support population inferences
about variables measured in the Covid-19 study (as such variables
are observed only for respondents and so cannot be included in
response models.).
Again we see that the null is always rejected with the calibra-
tion weights, but less often when the full IP weights are employed.5
The calibration weights lead to an overestimate of all of the condi-
tions, by between 2 and 5 percentage points. The point to stress is
that IP weights reduce the bias in all cases, and eliminate it entirely
in some. The results in Table 1 indicate that IP weights associated
with the COVID-19 Study are very effective in adjusting for non-
random attrition between Wave 9 of Main study and the COVID-
19 Study, and that the IP weights provide much a more credible
basis for population inferences than simple calibration weights.
Finally, the underlying Understanding Society samples are clus-
tered and stratified random samples, and so the COVID-19 sample
inherits this structure. We appropriately adjust standard errors for
the resulting design effects.4. Labour market shocks
In this section, we show the extent of heterogeneity and regres-
sivity in the labour market shocks that individuals face, and how
these shocks have evolved in the first three months of the pan-
demic. We describe labour market status using two main mea-
sures: whether an individual is employed and whether they are
working a positive number of hours. We chose these measures
because the UK Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme aims to main-
tain the employment relationship despite individuals not working
any hours.
In Table 2, we show the fraction employed (columns 1–4) and
the fraction working positive hours (columns 5–7) using reports
Table 2
Labour market shocks by individual characteristics.
Empl. x-sec. (Feb) Empl. (Feb) Empl. (April) Empl. (May) +ve hours (Feb) +ve hours (April) +ve hours (May) Group size (%)
All 79 79 77 77 79 54 58 100
Gender:
Men 83 83 80 81 82 57 61 46.8
Women 76 76 74 74 75 51 55 53.2
Ethnicity:
Not BAME 80 80 78 79 80 54 59 89.8
BAME 71 70 63 64 69 48 50 10.2
Age:
Age 20–29 78 76 69 72 75 44 52 19.8
Age 30–39 86 86 84 84 85 58 62 19.5
Age 40–49 85 86 85 85 85 63 6 22.2
Age 50–59 80 81 80 80 81 57 61 26.5
Age 60–65 59 57 55 55 57 37 40 12.1
Household type:
Adult, no child 69 72 69 70 72 50 55 12.6
Adult, child 71 72 72 72 71 46 48 3.2
Adults, no child 78 77 74 74 76 52 56 47.2
Adults, child 85 85 83 84 84 57 63 37.0
Pre-COVID-19 income
quintile:
1 60 62 58 59 61 37 39 18.9
2 78 76 73 73 76 45 51 20.2
3 85 85 83 84 85 57 63 20.6
4 87 86 84 85 85 62 66 20.5
5 86 86 84 83 84 67 69 19.8
Worker type:
Fixed hours 100 100 96 97 99 71 76 67.7
Flexible hours 100 100 95 95 98 73 74 7.2
Emp. sets (sure min.) 100 100 96 96 98 62 65 8.2
Emp. sets (no min.) 100 100 69 78 95 34 44 3.1
Self-employed 100 100 96 95 99 54 64 13.8
Notes: ‘‘Empl” is the fraction employed, where this includes both employees and the self-employed. ‘‘+ve hours” is the fraction who report actually working some hours,
independent of reported employment status. BAME refers to Black, Asian and Minority ethnic groups. Household type is measured in May andWorker type in February. ‘‘Emp.
sets (sure min)” are contracts where the employer chooses the hours of the worker, but guarantees a minimum number of hours; ‘‘Emp. sets (no min)” are contracts where the
employer chooses the hours of the worker and does not guarantee to offer any hours. Pre-COVID-19 income quintiles are assigned on the basis of household income averaged
across up to 3 previous waves of the main study. Sample sizes are 9531 (column 1) and 7404 (columns 2–7), except for the final panel (‘‘worker type”) which is conditional on
employment in February.
21 We have focused our discussion on the discrete measure of whether or not
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measures by individual characteristics, including gender, ethnicity,
age, average pre-COVID-19 income quintile, household type and
worker type. The first column shows (retrospective) numbers for
the February 2020 employment ‘‘baseline” using the April respon-
dent sample and associated cross-sectional weights. The remaining
columns of the Table are based on the balanced panel of respon-
dents to both April and May surveys, and the associated balanced
panel weight. Comparing the first and second column confirms
that the balanced panel (and associated weight) matches very clo-
sely the full cross-sectional numbers at a point in time.20 Column 8
reports the weighted group size to show the size of the groups
affected. Table 6 in the Online Appendix reports the unweighted
group sizes and actual numbers of observations by group.
The table shows that, in aggregate, employment levels have
changed very little between February and late May. This highlights
clearly the effectiveness of the government Coronavirus Job Reten-
tion Scheme that aimed to preserve employment. On the other
hand, the fraction of individuals who are working a positive num-
ber of hours fell 25 percentage points to April and only 54% of
working age individuals were working positive hours. There was
a slight recovery to 58% in the fraction working positive hours in
May. However, the key point is that the difference between the
fraction employed and the fraction working-positive-hours high-20 We present the February employment comparison as an illustration but this is
also true of other measures and at other points in time.
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lights starkly the potential unemployment problem when the Job
Retention Scheme finally ends.21
The absence of any impact on employment is difficult to recon-
cile with the substantial job losses reported by Adams-Prassl et al.
(2020). However, our numbers are consistent with the only other
probability-sample based employment data for the UK that we
are aware of, the Office of National Statistic’s Labour Force Survey.
That data also show almost no change in employment up to May
2020.22
The breakdown by individual characteristics in Table 2 shows
that while the labour market consequences have been felt across
the board, there are some groups that have been particularly
impacted, and others that were initially impacted but have
rebounded more. Hardest hit initially were those individuals
where the employer does not guarantee any minimum number
of hours: of those employed on such a zero hours contract in
February, the fraction working positive hours fell by the end of
April from 95% to 34%. This was followed by a 10 percentage point
bounce back in May. Sharp initial declines in the fraction working
positive hours and in employment were seen for those aged under
30, but again has bounced back a little. This highlights the double-individuals are working positive hours. Additionally, we have the actual hours
worked. The patterns observed for this continuous measure are very similar to those
for the discrete indicator.
22 https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employ-
mentandemployeetypes/bulletins/uklabourmarket/june2020.
Table 3
Reasons for decline in hours by May.
% with hours fall Emp. cuts Furlough Unemp. Loss of self-emp. business Health Caring
Report an hours fall 63 10 36 8 10 6 7
Gender:
Men 63 10 35 9 12 6 5
Women 63 10 36 8 9 6 8
Ethnicity:
Not BAME 63 10 37 7 10 6 6
BAME 64 12 22 20 13 10 13
Age:
Age 20–29 66 9 46 18 5 5 3
Age 30–39 61 9 36 7 8 4 15
Age 40–49 60 8 33 4 12 6 11
Age 50–59 63 13 32 6 12 7 2
Age 60–65 67 8 29 10 14 11 1
Household type:
Adult, no child 59 15 28 14 9 8 1
Adult, child 60 13 46 2 10 2 13
Adults, no child 62 10 38 9 9 6 2
Adults, child 64 9 35 7 11 6 14
Pre-COVID-19 income
quintile:
1 69 13 35 12 14 9 8
2 69 10 44 8 9 6 8
3 62 9 44 5 8 5 6
4 59 9 32 9 7 5 6
5 58 9 22 9 13 6 7
Worker type:
Fixed hours 56 11 43 8 0 5 5
Flexible hours 67 8 29 8 0 2 11
Emp. sets (sure min.) 72 19 49 6 0 6 4
Emp. sets (no min.) 89 11 49 35 0 4 3
Self-employed 86 2 6 6 53 11 14
Notes: The table refers to 6038 individuals employed in either February or April or both. Columns 2–7 report the fraction of those experiencing a decline in weekly work hours
by May who give reasons for the decline. Respondents can report multiple reasons for an hours decline and so the columns do not sum to one. BAME refers to Black, Asian and
Minority ethnic groups. Household type is measured in May and Worker type in February. ‘‘Emp. sets (sure min)” are contracts where the employer chooses the hours of the
worker, but guarantees a minimum number of hours; ‘‘Emp. sets (no min)” are contracts where the employer chooses the hours of the worker and does not guarantee to offer
any hours. Pre-COVID-19 income quintiles are assigned on the basis of household income averaged across up to 3 previous waves of the main study.
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tracts and the sort of jobs typically carried out by young workers.
Looking at the labour market impact by ethnicity, individuals from
minority ethnic groups experienced a substantially larger fall in
employment than others, whereas the overall decline in the frac-
tion working positive hours was similar. Across the distribution,
the bottom three quintiles experienced the greatest reductions in
the fraction working positive hours. Tables 7 and 8 in the Online
Appendix reports regression results for labour market status and
the change in labour market status, respectively, using the same
covariates as Table 2. The regression results confirm the differen-
tial effects shown in Table 2, and in particular the larger impacts
on BAME groups and the lower income quintiles.
Table 3 shows reported reasons for the fall in hours worked for
those who have experienced a decline by the end of May. In the
population, 63% of individuals reported some decline in hours
worked. This decline in hours may be caused directly by the health
shock, indirectly by impacts on the economy due to the health
shock, or for non-health related reasons. The first point to take
from Table 3 is that the decline in hours is driven by the economic
restrictions rather than directly by health or caring. Over 36% of
those reporting a decline in hours were part of the Coronavirus
Job Retention Scheme and so had substantial earnings replace-
ment. In addition, 8% report the decline in their hours being caused
by being made unemployed. By contrast, only 6% report health as a
reason for the decline in hours, and 7% report caring for others.
However, these averages mask considerable heterogeneity across
different types of individual. Caring is more important for those7
with children; and the effect of health restricting work increases
sharply with age.
Ethnicity is associated with a very different explanation for the
hours decline: individuals from minority ethnic (BAME) groups are
15 percentage points less likely to be supported by the Job Reten-
tion Scheme. Instead, they are 13 percentage points more likely to
cite unemployment as the reason for their hours decline. This
greater prevalence of unemployment among minority ethnic
groups was also shown in Table 2 above.
Our overall conclusion is that the labour market effects are
highly heterogeneous, particularly impacting the young, zero
hours workers and minority ethnic groups; and are regressive,
penalizing most the lower quintiles of the average pre-COVID-19
income distribution. The final point that Table 3 highlights is the
importance of the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme in the UK
which has maintained many of those not actually working any
hours notionally in employment. This is in marked contrast with
the US where support operated through the extension of unem-
ployment insurance without the same direct attempt to maintain
attachment to the employer.5. Earnings losses
Section 4 showed that the effect of the COVID crisis on labour
market outcomes varies substantially across individuals and across
the distribution. The Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme moderates
the link between hours and earnings for individuals, and the evi-
Table 4
Household earnings pre and post Covid.
% change since Feb
Feb April May April May
Mean p25 p50 p75 p25 p50 p75
All 549 501 478 18 0 0 41 6 6
Gender:
Men 573 519 490 17 0 0 44 7 5
Women 526 484 467 18 0 0 38 5 6
Age:
Age 20–29 503 454 482 20 0 0 32 2 20
Age 30–39 564 526 502 14 0 0 40 5 5
Age 40–49 571 534 487 16 0 0 42 8 1
Age 50–59 593 534 508 18 0 0 40 5 5
Age 60–65 446 386 346 30 0 0 76 13 9
Ethnicity:
Not BAME 564 515 490 17 0 0 40 6 5
BAME 411 370 368 22 0 0 42 4 8
Household type:
Adult, no child 560 471 461 50 0 0 51 2 3
Adult, child 266 230 249 20 0 0 33 0 2
Adults, no child 588 540 518 17 0 0 42 5 9
Adults, child 523 487 457 17 0 0 38 8 4
Pre-COVID-19 income
quintile:
1 287 245 228 31 0 0 60 13 4
2 395 356 365 20 0 0 36 6 7
3 487 444 428 15 0 0 34 3 4
4 664 593 559 14 0 0 43 8 4
5 860 817 765 12 0 0 39 2 8
Worker type:
Fixed hours 624 598 556 10 0 0 30 2 5
Flexible hours 704 660 616 9 0 0 36 2 6
Emp. sets (sure min.) 479 455 433 21 0 0 42 14 6
Emp. sets (no min.) 605 369 512 44 20 0 35 0 59
Self-employed 551 390 466 64 25 0 57 24 6
Notes: Earnings are weekly, net and equivalised. Sample size: 6160 individuals (col. 1–3), and 5673 individuals (col. 4–9) reporting positive February earnings. BAME refers to
Black, Asian and Minority ethnic groups. Household type is measured in May and Worker type in February. ‘‘Emp. sets (sure min)” are contracts where the employer chooses
the hours of the worker, but guarantees a minimum number of hours; ‘‘Emp. sets (no min)” are contracts where the employer chooses the hours of the worker and does not
guarantee to offer any hours. Pre-COVID-19 income quintiles are assigned on the basis of household income averaged across up to 3 previous waves of the main study.
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tive in doing so. Individual earnings losses may be cushioned by
the earnings of other household members. In this section, we con-
sider how the labour market shocks documented above translate
into changes in net household earnings for different households.
Table 4 reports the impact on household earnings through April
and May, and across the distribution. The measure of earnings we
use is net, equivalised weekly household earnings of the individual
respondents, including earnings from employment and self-
employment.23 Average household earnings declined by 10% by
the end of April, with a further 5% decline by the end of May. The
right-hand side of Table 4 shows the distribution of the change in
earnings, showing the 25th percentile, the median and the 75th per-
centile, and separately for April and for May. This highlights the
extent of losses and the extent that these losses have worsened:
the 25th percentile of the change was an 18% decline by April, but
by May the 25th percentile was a 41% decline. The median earnings
change has also deteriorated. On the other hand, the 75th percentile
of the earnings change is positive in May.23 In the COVID-19 Study, individual and household earnings are collected with
single questions. This differs from the main study, which aggregates information from
more detailed questions, but was necessitated by the strategy of brief, but frequent,
web surveys. (Micklewright and Schnepf, 2010) is one assessment of such ‘‘single
question” income data collection in surveys. Individual earnings are top-coded at
£4000 net per week, and household earnings is top-coded where the difference
between household and individual earnings exceeds £4000 net per week.
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When we consider the impact on earnings by average pre-
COVID-19 income level, the impact is increasingly severe the lower
down the average pre-COVID-19 income distribution. In the bot-
tom quintile, the median fall in earnings was 13% by May, whereas
in the top quintile, the median fall was only 2%. The differences are
equally stark at the 25th percentile of the percentage change: in
the bottom quintile, the 25th percentile fall was 60%. The impact
of COVID on earnings has been highly regressive.
There is also substantial heterogeneity both between and
within groups. Between groups, the young initially experienced
greater earnings changes, but by May, this position had reversed.
Indeed, by May, in terms of earnings declines, young individuals
show the least negative impact of any age group on household
earnings. This rebound in earnings reflects the labour market
changes over time shown in Table 2. Among the young, there
was also a range of winners and losers: at the 75th percentile,
the change in earnings was a 20% increase. Similar within group
heterogeneity is seen for those on zero-hour contracts and for
the self-employed.
6. Mitigation
The declines in household earnings documented above do not
necessarily translate into declines in household income or living
standards. Benefits, particularly Universal Credit, moderate the link
between earnings and income, and individuals and households
may take additional steps to moderate the link between income
Table 5
Mitigating earnings losses.
% with earn.
loss
Used
savings
Borrowed New
work
Mortgage
hol.
New Universal
credit
SEISS Family transfer
etc.
Used
foodbank
All 45 26 8 3 8 8 8 12 2
Gender:
Men 47 25 8 4 7 9 10 12 1
Women 44 27 8 3 10 7 7 13 4
Ethnicity:
Not BAME 45 25 7 3 8 8 8 12 2
BAME 42 36 21 4 11 11 12 15 3
Age:
Age 20–29 41 22 10 8 5 14 4 18 3
Age 30–39 45 23 9 4 13 9 6 16 2
Age 40–49 46 25 11 3 13 8 11 11 1
Age 50–59 45 32 6 2 6 9 10 12 1
Age 60–65 51 26 2 1 2 3 8 4 7
Household type:
Adult, no child 44 25 7 6 5 21 9 22 4
Adult, child 37 35 22 5 5 5 5 40 12
Adults, no child 43 26 4 2 4 7 7 8 3
Adults, child 48 25 11 4 14 7 10 14 1
Pre-COVID-19
income
quintile:
1 52 31 16 4 6 14 11 27 8
2 46 32 11 2 10 9 11 17 2
3 40 25 6 5 8 9 6 9 2
4 47 21 4 4 9 6 4 7 0
5 42 23 4 2 10 4 9 4 0
Worker type:
Fixed hours 40 21 6 2 9 4 0 9 1
Flexible hours 42 18 4 1 7 6 0 5 0
Emp. sets (sure min.) 53 22 11 6 5 17 0 16 1
Emp. sets (no min.) 41 25 3 31 16 36 0 11 1
Self-employed 59 53 15 7 12 23 54 17 1
Notes: Each cell refers to a percentage of individuals experiencing a household earnings loss of at least 10 percent between February and May. Methods of mitigation were
collected in both April and May and respondents can report multiple methods of mitigation at each monthly interview. Sample size: 2617. SEISS refers to the ‘‘Self-
employment Income Support Scheme”. BAME refers to Black, Asian and Minority ethnic groups. Household type is measured in May and Worker type in February. ‘‘Emp. sets
(sure min)” are contracts where the employer chooses the hours of the worker, but guarantees a minimum number of hours; ‘‘Emp. sets (no min)” are contracts where the
employer chooses the hours of the worker and does not guarantee to offer any hours. Pre-COVID-19 income quintiles are assigned on the basis of household income averaged
across up to 3 previous waves of the main study.
Fig. 1. Sources of Mitigation.
Notes: The sample is individuals who experienced a household earnings loss of at least 10 percent between February and May. Respondents can report multiple methods of
mitigation. Sample size: 2617. Pre-COVID-19 income quintiles are assigned on the basis of household income averaged across up to 3 previous waves of the main study.
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information on the different mechanisms used by individuals to
mitigate losses. In this section, we document the incidence of dif-
ferent mitigation strategies, including applications for universal9
credit, dis-saving, borrowing, transfers from friends and family
and the use of food banks. The point we stress is that in addition
to the heterogeneity in impact on earnings, there are important
differences in mitigation across groups and across individuals.
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individuals who have reported a decline in household earnings of
10% or more by May. Just under half of the population have expe-
rienced such a loss, but the extent of lost earnings would have been
substantially larger without the protection of the Coronavirus Job
Retention Scheme. We split the additional mitigation steps taken
into ‘‘Self-insurance” and ‘‘External” steps. Mitigation through
self-insurance includes the use of savings, borrowing, additional
work, or mortgage holidays. Mitigation from external sources
includes transfers from other family or friends as well as making
new applications for state benefits (through universal credit) or
the use of food banks.
At this stage in the crisis, more individuals had used self-
insurance, and in particular their own savings, than had accessed
external help to mitigate losses: more than a quarter had drawn
down their savings. Significant numbers had also increased bor-
rowing or asked for a mortgage holiday. New applications for
Universal Credit were 8%,24 but overall less prevalent than savings
or family transfers.
Table 5 provides a breakdown of mitigation for different
groups.25 Different groups of individuals used very different mecha-
nisms. Across the income distribution, borrowing and transfers from
family and friends increased sharply as average pre-COVID-19
income declines. Borrowing and transfers were also much more
marked for single parents; and similarly for minority ethnic groups,
where increased borrowing was three times as likely. By contrast, for
those on zero hour contracts, a third reported finding new work and
a third reported newly receiving universal credit.
The key question these results raise is how long support from
family and friends, or from individuals’ own saving and borrowing,
can continue. The end of the Job Retention Scheme will lead to
more widespread and deeper earnings losses potentially at the
same time as these support mechanisms will potentially be
exhausted.7. Conclusions
This paper shows that the aggregate effects of COVID-19 mask
considerable differences in how individuals are affected both
because they are differentially exposed to the labour market
shocks and because they use different private and public support
mechanisms. We present results from new high-quality UK data:
the Understanding Society COVID-19 Survey. We highlight three
important characteristics of data for understanding how house-
holds are impacted by economic crises: first, that information is
available as a crisis develops; second, an ability to estimate reliably
population and subpopulation quantities; third, a link to the eco-
nomic position of the observed households prior to the crisis.
Two months after the ‘‘stay at home” policy was introduced in
the UK at the end of March, unemployment had barely increased.
However, almost 50% of the working-age population were not
working positive hours, with many protected by the Coronavirus
Job Retention Scheme which required them not to work. The data
shows that despite being an aggregate shock, and despite the far
reaching policies introduced, the impact on individuals was highly
heterogeneous. We show that through the first wave of the pan-
demic, labour market impacts were most negative for individuals
from minority ethnic groups and those in the lowest quintile of
average pre-COVID-19 income. For many, the impact of the crisis
on employment has been mitigated by the Job Retention Scheme,
which proved crucial at limiting losses to household earnings in
the first wave, though at the cost of delaying sectoral reallocation24 Note this implies over a million new applications.
25 Table 9 in the Online Appendix reports regression results aligning with Table 5.
10(Barrero et al., 2020). Nonetheless, 45% of individuals had experi-
enced at least a 10% decline in household earnings.
We highlight that the welfare costs of these economic shocks
depend not just on the size of the direct shocks but also on the
mechanisms households have used to mitigate the shocks. We dis-
tinguish between self-insurance and external help. Self-insurance
through using savings and additional borrowing was highly preva-
lent. The use of additional borrowing was highest for those who
had been hardest hit in the labour market: the lowest income quin-
tiles and minority ethnic groups; as well as for single parents.
External support came from transfers from friends and family
and from new applications for welfare support. Transfers from
friends and family were particularly important for the most-
affected groups. This reliance of some households on borrowing
and on private transfers through the first wave of COVID-19 raises
the question of whether these households have sustainable mech-
anisms of mitigation through subsequent waves. This will be par-
ticularly important when the Coronavirus Job Protection
Scheme ends and those who are notionally employed but not
working any hours will move into unemployment or need to
adjust.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.
104334.
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